Can You Recover Attorney’s Fees for Litigating the Amount of Attorney’s Fees in a Florida Family Law Case?
In Florida divorce and family law cases, attorney’s fees can become their own battle.
A court may decide that one party is entitled to attorney’s fees under section 61.16, Florida Statutes. But the fight often does not end there. The parties may then litigate the amount of fees, including the attorney’s hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably spent, expert witness testimony, billing judgment, reductions, and objections.
That raises a separate question:
Can a party recover attorney’s fees incurred litigating the amount of attorney’s fees?
Florida appellate courts do not all answer that question the same way. The Second District, Third District, and Fourth District have taken different approaches, and the Florida Supreme Court has accepted review in Schultheis v. Schultheis, 430 So. 3d 987 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026), review granted, No. SC2026-0496 (Fla. June 4, 2026).
This issue matters in contested Florida divorce, post-judgment modification, contempt and enforcement, and family law appeal cases because fee litigation can be expensive by itself.
What Are “Fees for Fees”?
Florida courts often use the phrase “fees for fees” to describe attorney time spent litigating over attorney’s fees.
The Fourth District explained the concept in O’Boyle v. Town of Gulf Stream, 341 So. 3d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). A statutory fee claim may include three different categories:
Time spent litigating the merits;
Time spent litigating entitlement to attorney’s fees; and
Time spent litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.
The court stated: “The term ‘fees for fees’ is shorthand for time spent litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.” O’Boyle, 341 So. 3d at 338.
This blog addresses only the third category: fees incurred litigating the amount of fees.
The Starting Point: Palma’s General Rule
The starting point is State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1993). Palma was not a family law case. It involved attorney’s fees under section 627.428, Florida Statutes, in an insurance dispute.
The Florida Supreme Court held that fees could be awarded for litigating entitlement to fees, but not for litigating the amount of fees. The Court stated that attorney time spent litigating entitlement may be recoverable, but time spent litigating the amount “inures solely to the attorney’s benefit.” Palma, 629 So. 2d at 833.
That phrase—“inures solely to the attorney’s benefit”—became the foundation for later disputes over whether the same rule applies to family law fee awards under section 61.16.
The Second District: Wight Says No Fees for Litigating the Amount
In Wight v. Wight, 880 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), the Second District applied Palma in a post-judgment dissolution proceeding.
The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the former wife, including fees for time spent litigating the amount of attorney’s fees. The former husband appealed.
The Second District reversed that part of the award. The court reasoned that section 61.16 is designed to ensure that both parties have similar ability to retain competent counsel, but that the same policy does not justify awarding fees for litigating the amount of fees. The court stated that limiting “fees for fees” has the advantage of “encouraging parties to litigate fees in an efficient manner.” Wight, 880 So. 2d at 694.
The holding was direct:
“Because we find that Palma controls, we reverse on this issue and remand for the trial court to recalculate the award, eliminating those fees incurred for time spent litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.” Wight, 880 So. 2d at 694.
Under Wight, in the Second District, a party generally may not recover attorney’s fees incurred litigating the amount of attorney’s fees in a post-judgment dissolution fee dispute.
The Second District Later Limited Wight in Temporary Fee Litigation
The Second District later distinguished Wight in Baker v. Baker, 35 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Baker involved a temporary fee award. The husband appealed an order requiring him to pay $7,500 toward the wife’s temporary attorney’s fees. The wife sought appellate fees for defending the temporary fee award.
The Second District declined to extend Wight to that setting. The court stated: “We decline to extend Wight to temporary fee awards because it may affect the needy party’s ability to litigate the remainder of the case.” Baker, 35 So. 3d at 78.
The court also explained that, in the temporary fee context, determining the amount of temporary fees “does not inure solely to the attorney’s benefit” but also benefits the litigant. Baker, 35 So. 3d at 78.
So the Second District’s approach is not one-size-fits-all:
Wight bars fees for litigating the amount of fees in a post-judgment dissolution fee dispute.
Baker allows fee recovery in an appeal involving the amount of temporary fees because temporary fees affect the party’s ability to continue litigating the case.
The Fourth District: Schneider Says Fees for Fees May Be Awarded Under Section 61.16
The Fourth District took a different approach in Schneider v. Schneider, 32 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
In Schneider, the trial court concluded that it could not award fees for litigating the fee motion as a matter of law. The Fourth District reversed and held that “awarding fees for fee litigation in a marital dissolution case falls within the discretion of the trial court.” Schneider, 32 So. 3d at 153.
The Fourth District distinguished Palma. The court explained that Palma interpreted a different fee statute and was “not a general public policy pronouncement on the compensability of ‘fees for fees.’” Schneider, 32 So. 3d at 157.
The court emphasized the equitable nature of section 61.16. According to the Fourth District, when a family court decides attorney’s fees under section 61.16, it must consider both need and ability to pay. But to determine need and ability, the court must also consider the amount of fees. The Fourth District concluded that fees incurred litigating those issues are “part and parcel of the equitable proceedings.” Schneider, 32 So. 3d at 158.
The Fourth District expressly disagreed with Wight and stated: “Palma simply does not apply to section 61.16 fee awards.” Schneider, 32 So. 3d at 159.
Under Schneider, a Florida trial court in the Fourth District has discretion to award attorney’s fees incurred litigating the amount of fees in a section 61.16 family law case.
The Third District: Schultheis Rejects Fees for Fees and Certifies Conflict
The Third District addressed the same issue in Schultheis v. Schultheis, 430 So. 3d 987 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
In Schultheis, the former husband challenged an order awarding attorney’s fees incurred by the former wife’s non-party attorney in establishing the amount of his own fees. The Third District reversed.
The majority began from Palma, stating that attorney’s fees for time spent litigating the amount of fees are “almost never recoverable.” Schultheis, 430 So. 3d at 990.
The Third District then analyzed the language of section 61.16. The court focused on the statute’s authorization of fees for maintaining or defending a proceeding under chapter 61. In the majority’s view, litigating the amount of a non-party attorney’s own fees is not the same as maintaining or defending a dissolution, support, time-sharing, modification, enforcement, or appellate proceeding under chapter 61.
The court concluded that section 61.16 authorizes attorney’s fees for chapter 61 proceedings and for litigating entitlement to fees, “but not fees expended to litigate the amount.” Schultheis, 430 So. 3d at 994.
The Third District certified conflict with Schneider. The Florida Supreme Court has accepted review, so this issue is now pending before the state’s highest court.
The Schultheis Dissent Would Follow Schneider
The dissent in Schultheis viewed the issue differently.
Judge Bokor described the question as whether section 61.16 permits “fees for fees”—meaning fees incurred “in establishing the amount” of attorney’s fees to be awarded. Schultheis, 430 So. 3d at 996.
The dissent reasoned that the language of section 61.16 is broad and equitable. It would have followed the Fourth District’s decision in Schneider and allowed the trial court discretion to award fees incurred litigating the amount of fees.
The dissent also stated that Wight and Schneider “directly conflict.” Schultheis, 430 So. 3d at 1002.
That disagreement is now squarely before the Florida Supreme Court.
Current Florida District Split on “Fees for Fees”
Florida appellate courts do not currently apply one uniform rule on whether a party may recover attorney’s fees incurred litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.
Florida Supreme Court — State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1993)
Palma was not a family law case.
It involved attorney’s fees under Florida’s insurance fee statute.
The Florida Supreme Court allowed fees for litigating entitlement to fees, but not for litigating the amount of fees.
The Court reasoned that time spent litigating the amount of fees “inures solely to the attorney’s benefit.” Id. at 833.
Second District — Wight v. Wight, 880 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
The Second District applied Palma in a post-judgment dissolution proceeding.
The court held that the trial court should not have awarded fees for time spent litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.
The court reversed and remanded for recalculation of the award, “eliminating those fees incurred for time spent litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.” Id. at 694.
Under Wight, the Second District generally does not allow recovery of fees incurred litigating the amount of fees in that setting.
Second District — Baker v. Baker, 35 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
The Second District later limited Wight in the temporary-fee context.
The court declined to extend Wight to temporary fee awards because doing so “may affect the needy party’s ability to litigate the remainder of the case.” Id. at 78.
Baker is important because temporary fees are different from a final or post-judgment fee dispute over the amount of fees.
Fourth District — Schneider v. Schneider, 32 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
The Fourth District disagreed with the Second District’s approach in Wight.
The court held that “awarding fees for fee litigation in a marital dissolution case falls within the discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 153.
The Fourth District concluded that Palma does not control section 61.16 family law fee awards.
Under Schneider, a trial court may award fees incurred litigating the amount of fees in a family law case, subject to the court’s discretion.
Third District — Schultheis v. Schultheis, 430 So. 3d 987 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026)
The Third District rejected an award of attorney’s fees incurred litigating the amount of a non-party attorney’s own fees.
The court held that section 61.16 authorizes fees for chapter 61 proceedings and for litigating entitlement to fees, but not fees incurred litigating the amount of fees.
The Third District certified conflict with Schneider.
Florida Supreme Court — Schultheis v. Schultheis, No. SC2026-0496
The Florida Supreme Court has accepted review of Schultheis.
Until the Supreme Court resolves the certified conflict, Florida law remains divided by district on whether section 61.16 allows recovery of fees incurred litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.
So, Is a Florida Party Entitled to Fees for Litigating the Amount of Fees?
The most accurate answer is: it depends on the district, the procedural posture, and whether the Florida Supreme Court has resolved the conflict by the time the issue is decided.
As of now:
In the Second District, Wight generally bars fees for litigating the amount of fees in a post-judgment dissolution fee dispute, but Baker allows fees in the temporary-fee appeal context.
In the Fourth District, Schneider allows the trial court discretion to award fees for litigating the amount of fees under section 61.16.
In the Third District, Schultheis rejects fees for litigating the amount of fees under section 61.16 and certifies conflict with Schneider.
The Florida Supreme Court has accepted review in Schultheis, so the law may soon become uniform statewide.
Until the Florida Supreme Court decides the issue, parties litigating attorney’s fees in Florida family law cases should preserve the issue carefully, identify the controlling district authority, and distinguish between fees incurred litigating entitlement and fees incurred litigating amount.
That distinction can matter in high-conflict divorce, paternity, child support, modification, enforcement, and appellate proceedings.
Why This Issue Matters
Fee litigation can be expensive. In complex family law cases, the hearing over the amount of fees may involve:
Detailed billing records;
Expert testimony on reasonableness;
Objections to hourly rates;
Objections to time entries;
Claims of duplication or inefficiency;
Allocation between compensable and non-compensable work;
Litigation over the need for reductions; and
Appeals from the fee award.
If the time spent litigating the amount of fees is recoverable, the fee award may be substantially larger. If it is not recoverable, the attorney or client may have to absorb that time even if the party was otherwise entitled to fees.
That is why this issue is not just technical. It affects settlement leverage, trial strategy, appellate preservation, and the real cost of litigating a Florida family law case.
The Bottom Line
Florida law is unsettled on whether section 61.16 allows an award of attorney’s fees incurred litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.
The Second District’s Wight decision says no in a post-judgment dissolution fee dispute. The Second District’s Baker decision says temporary fee litigation is different. The Fourth District’s Schneider decision says yes, within the trial court’s discretion. The Third District’s Schultheis decision says no and certifies conflict with Schneider.
The Florida Supreme Court has accepted review in Schultheis. Until that decision is issued, this remains one of the most important unresolved attorney’s fee issues in Florida family law.
One strategy in dealing with an inability to be awarded “fees for fees” under section 61.16, Florida Statutes, is to serve requests for admissions directed at the reasonableness of hourly rates and certain fees. To the extent that a party refuses to admit the reasonableness of rates or certain fees, the court can assess fees under
Speak With a Florida Family Law Attorney About Attorney’s Fees
Mockler Leiner Law, P.A. represents clients in complex Florida family law cases involving attorney’s fees, divorce, paternity, child support, enforcement, modification, and appeals.
If attorney’s fees are a contested issue in your Florida family law case, call Mockler Leiner Law, P.A. at (813) 331-5699 or contact us online to speak with an experienced Florida family law attorney.
